In important respects, the Egyptian and Tunisian states had both claimed the mantle of Islamic
modernism to justify their constitutional and legal orders.
1 And while it is impossible to predict what the new constitutional orders of Egypt and Tunis will look like, one core demand, indeed, perhaps the only demand that united the various forces that came together to produce the successful revolutions, was the desire to replace regimes that had systematically undermined the legality of the state and transformed the law from a neutral measure of justice into a tool to enrich the ruling elite and to punish its enemies. The desire to control government, ensure that it is accountable to the public, that it legislates for the public good, and that it applies its law fairly, however, were the core demands of modernist Islamic political thought. To the extent that the Egyptian and Tunisian regimes can be viewed as Islamic modernist regimes, and to the extent that these revolutions were fundamentally about restoring the legitimacy of the state against the regimes that had subverted them, it would not be erroneous to call both revolutions "Islamic" in the very specific sense of "modernist" Islam.
A crucial feature of modernist Islamic political thought, at least as manifested in the Islamic modernist traditions in Tunisian and Egyptian intellectual history, is its insistence that religious teachings, insofar as they are relevant to building political society, must be interpreted in a manner consistent with the goals of freedom, national development and democratic decisionmaking. This modernist configuration of the theo-political in turn renders political coalitions with non-Islamic political movements palatable. Indeed, in important respects, Islamic modernists are politically more comfortable with secular political movements than they are with 1 Space does not permit a full justification for this statement, but both Tunisia and Egypt, in their first postWorld War I constitutions, self-consciously included Islam as the religion of state in full awareness of, and in contrast to, Kemalist secularism; both states chose to reform Islamic family law using Islamic modernist justifications rather than adopt European family codes; and, in the case of Egypt at least, its civil code claimed to be both fully Islamic and modern. other potential configurations of the Islamic theo-political. 2 In the contemporary Sunni world, credible alternatives to Islamic modernism exist in Sunni traditionalism, which espoused a combination of strict adherence to historical teachings of the doctrinal legal and theological schools along with a strong doctrine of political quietism, and Salafism, which, although it rejects the binding authority of the doctrinal schools of law, substitutes instead a strong commitment to adherence to the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad and the earliest generations of the Muslim community as documented in various historical sources. Salafism is usually politically quietist, although this is not always the case. Importantly, neither the Sunni Traditionalists, nor the Salafists, adopt the nationalist project as part of a religious imperative that needs to inform how Muslims understand Islam in the modern age. absence of all-out religious wars that sought the elimination of non-conformist religious communities in the former led in the Middle East to a hierarchical system of pluralism grounded in Islamic law. While this system was internally justified to Sunni Muslims by its truth, nonMuslims were expected to obey the law on the premise that the political order of Sunni Islam was a just one that guaranteed non-Muslims their essential rights. Legally, this relationship was manifested through the doctrine of dhimma, pursuant to which non-Muslims agreed to bind themselves to the non-religious norms of Islamic law (iltizām aḥkām al-islām). In exchange for this commitment, the Muslim community undertook to afford such non-Muslims all the legal (but not political) rights and protections afforded to Muslims on a basis of equality, but affording non-Muslims freedom to observe their own religious practices. This system was encapsulated in two statements attributed to the Prophet Muhammad who was reported as saying that if nonMuslims accepted this relationship, "They have our rights and our obligations" (lahum mā lanā wa 'alayhim mā 'alaynā), but that "they should be left alone in their religious affairs" (yutrakūna wa mā yadīnūna).
4 Accordingly, so long as Muslim political authorities applied Islamic law fairly and impartially, the rights of non-Muslims would be fully respected, even though they did not necessarily participate in their formulation.
By the 19 th century, however, important transformations in the relationship between Islamic states and Europe had shaken the confidence of the Sunni political and religious elite. In particular, the Ottomans no longer seemed able to defend Islamic territories against encroaching European powers, and while initially its military weaknesses were felt primarily outside the Middle Eastern heartland of Islam, in 1798 French forces under the leadership of Napoleon Bonaparte, successfully invaded and occupied Egypt. In the wake of the obvious weakness of the Ottoman Empire vis-à-vis Europe, the political class ushered in a series of political,
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Although Hanafi jurists regularly cite these two principles as statements of the Prophet, see, e.g., alKashmīrī, Fayḍ al-Bārī Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī ("lā yuqtal muslim fī kāfir"), I have not been able to locate them in any collection of hadiths. The 19 th century Hanafi jurist, Ibn ʻĀbidin, however, quotes the fourth Sunni caliph, and the first Shiʻī Imām, "Alī b. Abī Ṭālib as saying "They agreed to pay jizya [i.e., the poll-tax] only so that their lives and properties could be like our lives and properties." Kitab al-Jihād.
administrative, and increasingly, legal, reforms, first in Egypt and then throughout the Ottoman Empire. These reforms, generally known as the Tanẓīmāt, were intended to usher in a new era,
al-niẓām al-jadīd.
Modernist Islamic political thought can be viewed as the theoretical counterpart to the tanẓīmā. The task of modernist Islamic political theory was to produce a theory of Islamic law and the state that reconciled the new order to the underlying ideology of Sunni political theory, namely, that the state is bound to Islamic law. The answer they give, essentially, is that the new order -an important part of which was legal reform -did not contradict or supplant the Sharī"a, but instead vindicated it by making it more effective. Islamic modernists" quest to make the Sharī"a more effective in turn required them to argue for profound changes in the way Muslims understood Islamic law, its relationship to rational politics (political philosophy), the relationship of the ruler and the ruled, and the rights of non-Muslims.
III. Overview of Islamic Modernist Political Ideas 5
Rifā"a Rāfi" al-Ṭahtāwī (d. 1873) is usually taken to be the forerunner of Islamic modernism. 6 As a young man who had only recently concluded his studies at the mosque college of al-Azhar, he was selected to accompany the first delegation of Egyptian students sent to France to study the "modern sciences." Ṭahṭāwī was a keen observer and student of French life and upon his return to Cairo, he published a widely-read memoire (Takhlīṣ al-Ibrīz fī Talkhīṣ Bārīz) which described his experiences in Paris, and the social, cultural, political and economic life of 19 would befall them if they behaved in conformity with the law.
12 There remained, however, the troubling question of the metaphysical foundations of French law: they were clearly "rational,"
i.e., not derived from revelation, and he remained committed to a political system whose foundations were revelatory.
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Ṭahṭāwī attempted to work out a more systematic account of the relationship of rational law to revealed law in The Reliable Guide. Central to his argument was the notion of the waṭan, the homeland, and the obligations that individuals have to honor it and improve it. This process of improvement, which is both material and moral, Ṭahṭāwī calls tamaddun, "civilizing."
Revealed law and rational law work together toward this end. While mankind had a kind of instinctual natural law that enabled it to live prior to such time that God sent prophets, revelation established the foundation for true civilization, with Islam establishing the foundations for universal civilization. Non-Muslim civilizations also had drawn on the foundational principles of Islam to develop their own civilizations, according to al-Ṭahṭāwī, but because they base their civilization (tamaddun) solely on reason (ʻaql) rather than revelation (sharʻ), they risk including activities within the scope of civilization that are in fact not part of civilization at all, e.g., the casual mixing of the sexes. In any case, it is the task of the ruler to develop rational law (qānūn siyāsa) that aims to improve and honor the homeland. To do this, the citizens must enjoy civic freedom (al-ḥurriyya al-madaniyya), i.e., not be subject to punishment or other interference in the exercise of legal privileges, and to secure this end, it is as though the citizens have promised one another mutual support in the exercise of their lawful rights and against anyone who would interfere in the exercise of those rights. Civic freedom, and the rational laws that nourish it, are 12 Id., 181. 
al-amr bi-l-maʻrūf wa-l-nahy ʻan al-munkar)."
The ahl al-ḥall wa-l-ʻaqd must discharge this monitoring function because the law, although it is intended as a restraint (waziʻ) against arbitrary rule, is itself helpless to vindicate the law when it is when broken. By acting as monitors of legality, the ahl al-ḥall wa-l-ʻaqd, in Khayr al-Dīn"s theory, act as an institutional restraint (wāziʻ) to insure that the ruler respects the law.
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The law that binds the ruler is of course the Sharīʻa, but not in the traditional sense; rather, it is law derived from "the foundations of the Sharīʻa (uṣūl al-sharīʻa)" but whose precise fulfilling the intended purposes of the Sharīʻa by securing more effective justice, and accordingly, was not only in conformity with the Sharīʻa, but in fact required by it. For the reforms to succeed, however, religious scholars would have to abandon their traditional role in favor of a much more forward looking system of education that focused on modern knowledge and integrate themselves more organically with the state rather than distancing themselves from politics based on a false assumption that piety demanded maintaining their distance from political life. what he believed to be the three political options available to Muslim peoples. 25 The first was a continuation of traditional politics of the sort that dominated the late Ottoman Empire, in which both religious and political life was characterized by a mutually-reinforcing political and religious despotism (istibdād). The second was to adopt a radically secular approach to political life in the manner espoused by Kamal Muṣṭafā (Attaturk) and which had produced the Turkish The first option would be catastrophic, as it would deliver the government to those in Muslim society least capable of performing government"s most elementary functions, and to make things worse, its incompetence would be justified in the name of traditional religious doctrines of fidelity to the ruler and to the ancient teachings of the jurists. 26 The second option at least has the virtue of offering Muslims the prospect of competent rule, but at the price of a new kind of despotism and the religiously catastrophic institutionalization of secularism. 27 The third option was superior therefore because it would respect Muslims" religious commitments, but at the same time, because it offered a flexible and non-dogmatic approach to Islamic law, the reformist program stood ready to adopt the reforms in Islamic law necessary to make it a viable system of modern law that could secure the independence, progress and dignity of Muslim peoples.
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The key to Riḍā"s program of legal reform was replacing what he called "religious despotism" (al-istibdād al-dīnī) that depended on a system of unqualified deference (taqlīd) to historical authorities with a new legal system that would be consistent with popular sovereignty (siyādat al-shaʻb) 29 and whose method of law-making would rely on independent reasoning (ijtihād), 30 exercised collectively through deliberative institutions rather than individualistically as conceived of in classical jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh) . 
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While revealed law provided points of reference in Riḍā"s scheme, it did not form categorical obstacles to legislative enactments that were needed for the public good, even when such enactments contradicted revealed law. Riḍā explains this seemingly strange result by claiming that revealed law is categorical only with respect to ritual observance; as for its regulations of secular life, Muslims were free to adopt legislation that went beyond or even contradicted these texts because the intent of those rules was not to prove devotion to God, but rather to further human welfare. When other methods are discovered that achieve the same end, or achieve them in a more efficient fashion, there is no harm in Muslims adopting those rules.
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Finally, for Riḍā adoption of the reform party"s agenda would also solve the problem of atheism in the Islamic world. In Riḍā"s analysis, atheism was the product not of careful philosophical or theological reflection, but rather that of the immoral alliance between political and religious despotism that worked hand-in-glove to preclude Muslim peoples from gaining political freedom and participating in modern civilization.
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For all three of these thinkers, a stripped-down version of the Sharīʻa, i.e., its "foundations," combined with rational law derived in light of those foundations, and in the case and political freedom for Muslim peoples. By solving the problem of despotism, these thinkers hoped to ensure that Muslim governments would reliably legislate for the public interest, and by establishing institutions to make sure that those laws would be applied impartially, good government would be restored to the Muslim world and they would able to take their rightful place as independent states in the modern world. Indeed, for all three of these thinkers, religious and political ("rational") virtues were mutually-reinforcing, leading to the moral, material and political progress of human society.
IV. Conclusion
The fundamental goal of modernist Islamic political thought was to define what good governance in accordance with the Sharīʻa meant in the modern age. The conclusions they reached all entailed supplanting the detailed, technical rules of historical Islamic law in favor of adopting "rational" methods of law-making that focused on the public good, while taking into account the "foundations" of the Sharīʻa. Because of the practical priority of rational law over revealed law, one could easily make the mistake that little separates Islamic modernists from their secularist counterparts. This would be mistaken. Secular modernists continue to be suspicious of religion generally, and view it to be a dangerous force that can potentially subvert Islamic modernism, therefore, continues to be salient if only because it continues to respond to the most pressing political issues facing citizens of the Arab world today, namely, despotism, poor-governance, and outright corruption. "The Arab Spring," as this revolutionary moment has come to be called, will be successful if it institutionalizes the "good governance"
project that lay behind Islamic modernism. Achievement of reasonable pluralism, of the sort described by Rawls in Political Liberalism, however, will have to await another generation, but I have no doubt that it will come, perhaps sooner than anyone realizes.
